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ABSTRACT
E.J. Lowe (2008) proposes a dualist conception of agents. He grounds his dualist view on 
the Unity Argument, which I claim relies on unwarranted presuppositions about the agent 
and, therefore, cannot support his view. This is a problem for Lowe’s account of actions as 
well, because his account relies on his dualist view of agents.
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Introduction
Explanations of a ions can rely on several implicit suppositions about human agency and 
about what has to be captured by an accurate account of a ions. Here, I will focus on the concept 
of agents endorsed by E.J. Lowe in Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (2008); 
and I will argue that it does not resist scrutiny. Lowe’s dualist view of agents is particularly rele-
vant to his theory, for it both grounds and motivates the alleged need for his volitionist explana-
tion of a ions in order to satisfactorily account for the agent’s free a ions. Showing that there is 
a problem with the concept of agents adopted by the theory results in a problem for the theory.
In the second section, I will clarify Lowe’s conception of agents and his allegation that the 
agent is something different from her body. In the third section, I will discuss Lowe’s argument 
for the separation of the person and her body, and the problems it faces. Then, I will complete the 
criticism of Lowe’s view of agents by raising some brief objections to his argument that a person’s 
brain can be exchanged for another brain without producing any noticeable difference in the 
person in question.  
The concept of agents
In this section E.J. Lowe’s (2008) anti-reductionist view of a ions and its fit with how he 
perceives agents will be elucidated. This will make Lowe’s view on agents clear, as well as what 
presuppositions underlie it.2 According to Lowe (2008), agents are psychological beings who are 
distinct from their bodies, and which are chara erized by their causal power—a view that should 
be considered carefully. Lowe’s definition of agents is the following:
An ‘agent’, in the sense I intend here, is a persisting object—or ‘individual 
substance’—possessing various properties, including, most importantly, cer-
tain causal powers and liabilities. A paradigm example of an agent would be 
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a human being or other conscious creature, 
capable of performing intentional actions 
(Lowe, 2008, p. 122).
The ideas involved in this definition should be consid-
ered point-by-point. (a) The notion of a persisting object 
refers to time; and it does not seem to be controversial that 
agents persist in time. (b) The notion of substance is associat-
ed with the (c) causal powers and liabilities the agent has, and 
these will need to be explained in more detail. 
Regarding agents as substances, Lowe says that “I hold 
that I am a psychological substance coinciding with, but 
numerically distinct from, my animal body”3 (Lowe, 2008, 
p. 167). One may conclude from this that he espouses du-
alism, and that this dualism is at the core of how he sees 
human beings as agents, because this kind of substance al-
legedly has causal powers that are specific to the psycho-
logical substance and not to her body. Lowe emphasises 
this distinction: 
Central amongst our distinctive psycholog-
ical powers are our powers of perception, 
thought, reason, and will. It is I who per-
ceive, think, reason, and will, not my body 
nor any distinguished part of it, such as 
my brain or central nervous system (Lowe, 
2008, p. 168). 
According to Lowe, it is the psychological substance, 
and not her body that has the power of the will; this is a key 
element in his account of a ion, as will be seen in the fol-
lowing. Lowe’s definition of the agent as a psychological sub-
stance, distinct from her body, together with his rejection of 
the principle of causal closure4 allow him to claim that phys-
ical events are not sufficient to cause the agent’s movements, 
because the body lacks a will, which he thinks is fundamental 
for the agent to perform free a ions. This leaves room for the 
will to have causal relevance in the production of the agent’s 
a ions. The power of the will is attributed to the psycholog-
ical substance, not to her body, by means of which the agent 
causes a ion-results. 
In order to understand Lowe’s definition of agents more 
needs to be said about the agent’s power. Lowe holds a  ecific 
view of how the agent is capable of performing intentional 
a ions, which is related to what causal powers she may have: 
[W]hat we seem to have in such a case is an 
instance of irreducible agent causation. An-
imate agents, we may feel tempted to say, 
are capable of spontaneous self-movement, 
which involves an agent’s causing motion in 
its own limbs or other body parts directly 
(Lowe, 2008, p. 128).
 What he means by agent causation, nevertheless, is not 
what is traditionally called agent causation. Lowe defends the 
claim that agents irreducibly cause their a ions, but not by 
directly causing them, as Agent Causation5 would have it. He 
proposes what he considers to be a mix of agent causation and 
volitionism in order to explain human a ions.
The volitionist believes that it is always by 
willing that we cause action results, such 
as arm risings, to occur when we act free-
ly and that, indeed, our willings or voli-
tions are causes of those events, in the 
event-causation sense of ‘cause’. Precisely 
because, as we have seen, willings are not 
causings, they may qualify as events and 
thus as causes and effects of other events 
(Lowe, 2008, p. 152).
This account allows for a mental state, a volition, to be 
causally relevant in the production of a ion-results. Lowe 
calls a ion-results the movements produced by volitions, be-
cause the agent’s willing is itself her a ion. The agent, none-
theless, still irreducibly produces her volition: “the volitions 
themselves, I have said, are uncaused—and they, by my ac-
count, are not physical events, since they are exercises of a 
non—physical mental power” (Lowe, 2008, p. 178).
 This elucidates the kind of causal power the agent is 
said to have on this theory. By a ing in an uncaused man-
ner—i.e., by willing—the agent causes a ion-results in the 
world. Nevertheless, the will is not a causal power in the way 
that magnetism is a causal power. According to Lowe, the 
distinction is that the agent’s willing is not determined “by 
the causal influence of other objects” (Lowe, 2008, p. 155)—
contrary to event-causation, which Lowe perceives as be-
ing determined, or chancy. Lowe’s concern about event-
causation is that
all our actions, including the supposedly 
free ones, are (it may be said) just events, 
and all events are either causally deter-
mined by prior events or else are chance 
occurrences (though their chances may be 
fixed by prior events). Either way, there is no 
room for the notion that we are the authors 
3 What Lowe means by substances is that “a substance is an ontologically independent entity that bears properties, stands in relations 
to other substances, persists through time, and undergoes qualitative change over time. Most importantly, for our purposes, substances 
possess causal powers and liabilities. These are species of disposition” (Lowe, 2008, p. 165).
4 By causal closure Lowe means: “For any physical event e, if e has a cause at time t, then e has a wholly physical sufficient cause at t” 
(Lowe, 2008, p. 63).
5 I use the term agent causation to refer to the so called irreducible power of the agent (in opposition to event-causation), and Agent 
Causation to refer to the theory.
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of our actions in any sense that would suit 
the libertarian (Lowe, 2008, p. 160).
This makes clear that Lowe’s rejection of the reduction-
ist view—which accepts that a ions are causally produced by 
events—is related to the issue of free will. Lowe believes that 
event-causation involves events being determined or chancy, 
which is said to be part of a framework in which the agent 
cannot be included, because agents are conceived as free. If 
the causing of events is not determined, this means that it 
would depend on chance, while chance itself also depends on 
previous events. Both these options are deemed unsatisfacto-
ry by Lowe, because neither would allow for the agent’s free-
dom as uncaused choice does. 
According to this view, desires and beliefs can cause ac-
tions, just not free rational a ion. For instance, if an agent 
jumps out of the way of a falling slate that would probably 
injure him, Lowe says:
[H]is action of jumping out of the way of the 
slate will only qualify as a free and so ratio-
nal action if he chooses to jump out of the 
way in the light of his desire. If the desire 
merely causes him to jump out of the way 
the power of choice is not exercised by the 
agent on this occasion, his behavior is un-
doubtedly reasonable, in that it furthers his 
interests, but it is not an instance of rational 
action (Lowe, 2008, p. 186).
The agent’s choice is what makes the difference between 
rational and free a ion and just reasonable a ion. It is pos-
sible to conclude that this is the case because the latter lacks 
what Lowe calls the executive element of the production of 
a ion; i.e., the irreducible role of the agent.
The above said paints a revealing picture of what Lowe 
means by the agent’s being “capable of performing intentional 
a ions” (2008, p. 122) and her causal powers. The account of 
how agents perform a ions assures the kind of free will that 
Lowe considers relevant: “on this view, persons are agents in-
asmuch as they are substance-causes of certain events” (Lowe, 
2008, p. 147).   
The proposed dualism and the defence of the will are 
therefore necessary to account for free a ions, because Lowe 
believes that free a ions cannot be caused; they must be un-
caused. The uncaused will is attributed to the human agent 
portrayed as a psychological substance distinct from her body, 
because the body is associated with the event-causation of 
movements. In this sense, the psychological substance, which 
is the agent, can be conceived as being free in the sense consid-
ered relevant in this theory, and this is what motivates Lowe’s 
volitionist account of a ions. 
Lowe’s picture of agency therefore associates the agent 
with the psychological substance, not with her body, making 
this conception of agents and his view of agency dependent 
on the claim that that the psychological substance has the said 
power of the will, and that she is in fact something different 
from her body. If the agent was identified with her body, one 
may conclude that Lowe would consider her a ions unfree. 
In this case, the agent would not fit the volitionist theory. 
In the next section I will consider the arguments offered by 
Lowe to support his dualist view, which grounds his view of 
agents as psychological substances.   
The agent as a 
different substance
In this section, Lowe’s argument that the person is a 
different substance to the body will be discussed and criti-
cised. It will be argued that Lowe’s position does not with-
stand scrutiny. In short, the Non-Cartesian Substance Du-
alism proposed by Lowe is an ontological distinction based 
on the identity conditions of persons—subjects of experi-
ence6—and their bodies; allegedly, the person cannot be 
identified with her body and vice-versa. According to his 
view, a substance is a bearer of properties and chara eris-
tic causal powers; thus, the psychological substance bears 
psychological properties and has a causal power that supple-
ments those of her body. 
Lowe argues that the person, or self,7 is not identical to 
her body because the body is not the subject of one’s experi-
ence. Only the person is the subject of her experiences, and 
the person cannot be identical to her body or her brain. Lowe 
posits the Unity Argument as the strongest argument in sup-
port of the claim that the person is not identical to her body: 
 (1) I am the subject of all and only my own mental states, 
which is a self-evident truth. The second premise is this: 
 (2) Neither my body as whole [which we will consider here 
‘my brain as a whole’]8 nor any part of it could be the sub-
ject of all and only my own mental states.
 And its conclusion, which undoubtedly follows from the 
two premises, is this:
 (3) I am not identical to my body nor with any part of it 
(Lowe, 2008, p. 96).
6 Lowe considers the agent a person, and the person as a subject of experience. “Subjects of experience—understanding ‘experience’ 
here in a broad sense, to include not just sensory and perceptual experience, but also introspective and cognitive states or, in other 
words, ‘inner’ awareness and thoughts” (Lowe, 2008, p. 94).
7 Lowe uses persons and selves interchangeably.
8 Lowe allows that “my body as whole” can be substituted by “my brain as a whole” in case physicalists identify the self with the brain 
(2008, p. 97).
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This conclusion is unwarranted, though. It may be hard 
for the monist to find a reason to accept (1), that I am the 
subject of only my mental states. She may believe that the per-
son’s physical properties are attributable to the person as well. 
Here, nevertheless, I will concentrate on the second premise. 
Premise (2) is Lowe’s identity criterion; therefore, it is exact-
ly what Lowe is trying to argue. He already assumes that the 
body is not the bearer of experience; thus, it is a different sub-
stance, which makes it necessary to postulate that the person 
is a substance that is the subject of her mental states, consid-
ering that substances are understood as bearers of properties. 
But this is what he is trying to prove in the first place, mean-
ing that the argument is simply question begging. Lowe, of 
course, is not unaware that he needs to argue for (2); he gives 
it the following support:
All that I am claiming is that there is no part 
of my brain which is such that, were any part 
of it—such as one particular neuron—to be 
destroyed, all of my mental states would 
thereby cease to be. That is to say, neither 
my brain as a whole, nor any distinguished 
part of it as a whole, is something with 
which I can be identified—any more than I 
can be identified with my body as a whole—
because no such entity is such that all and 
only my mental states can be taken to de-
pend on it, in the way that they clearly do 
depend on me (Lowe, 2008, p. 98).
In order to understand Lowe’s claims it will help to 
structure them: (i) the person needs a brain to have mental 
states, but she does not need the brain as a whole in order to 
have all of her mental states. This is equated to saying that (ii) 
all and only one’s mental states cannot depend either on the 
brain as a whole nor on any part of it as a whole, i.e., neither 
the brain nor a neuron can be the subject of all of one’s mental 
states; only the subject of one’s mental states can. So, Lowe 
concludes that (iii) the person is not identical with her brain 
or any part of it. 
Observed closely, (i) still needs support, for there is no 
reason why a monist should accept it. Lowe supports it by 
pointing out that one could not have one’s mental states if 
one’s brain was destroyed; however, all of one’s mental states 
are unaffected if a neuron ceases to exist. This means that my 
brain does not have to be whole in its integrity in order for 
me to have all of my mental states; and therefore it is not the 
subject of my experiences, because all of one’s mental states 
continue to exist even if the brain loses a neuron (see Lowe, 
2008, p. 98-99). 
The argument, and premise (i), depend on Lowe’s claims 
about all of one’s mental states. This claim will be discussed be-
low, since (ii) also depends on Lowe’s presuppositions about 
all of one’s mental states. It is no coincidence that Lowe treats 
claim (ii) as a clarification of premise (i): according to Lowe’s 
theory, they are saying similar things. I now turn to unveiling 
the presuppositions in this view.
One must keep in mind that Lowe is aiming at sup-
porting premise (2), from the Unity Argument, but his 
second argument brings out something interesting. In (ii) 
Lowe says that all of one’s mental states do not depend on 
one’s body or a body part, so he already assumes that one’s 
mental states form a unity; according to his theory, this 
unity is born by the self, to which they can be identified. 
This may come as no surprise since it is supporting some-
thing called the Unity Argument, but it is hard to see why 
Lowe would believe that it is uncontroversial that a per-
son’s mental states are a unity. 
There is evidence showing that if a certain part of the 
brain is lesioned, the person ceases to have certain mental 
states. This makes it hard to accept that all of one’s mental 
states depend on either the brain as a whole or on a part of it 
as a whole—e.g. a neuron. It is possible that different mental 
states are related to different brain a ivities, and that a lesion 
to some neuronal networks will not lead to the person losing 
all of her mental states, but perhaps to her losing a few intro-
 ective and cognitive states (to use Lowe’s terms). So why 
would Lowe claim that in order to depend on one’s brain all 
of one’s mental states would have to be subject to the brain as 
a whole, or to a part of it as a whole?
The best explanation is that Lowe is not talking about 
mental states; he is talking about all of one’s mental sates as 
a unity, which chara erises the self. Lowe is already presup-
posing that all of the person’s mental states form a unity that, 
as such, have in common a bearer of these mental states that 
unifies them: the self. 
It could be argued that mental states have something 
in common that allows classifying them all as mental states; 
however, this does not imply that they form an ontologically 
distinct unit. The same can be said of whatever allows clas-
sifying my phone’s apps as apps. I believe that few people, if 
any, would accept that this implies that they form an ontolog-
ically distinct unity of all of my phone’s apps. If what makes 
mental states a unity is that they are all subject to the same 
thing, then they are subject to the self, and the psychological 
substance is their bearer, according to this view. Therefore, all 
of one’s mental states cannot be subject to a neuron or to the 
brain by definition. 
But why would the monist accept these presuppositions? 
My objection is that Lowe grounds his defence of his dualist 
conception of persons on implicit suppositions about men-
tal states and their relation to the person as he conceives her, 
i.e., as a psychological substance that is the bearer of all of her 
mental states and distinct from her body. Lowe is assuming 
what he is trying to argue: that all of one’s mental states form 
a unit subject to the self, and his defence of this view assumes 
that mental states are a unity that would have to together de-
pend on either the brain as a whole or on a part of the brain, a 
neuron, if it did depend on the body. When Lowe states that 
neither the brain nor any part of it is “something with which 
I can be identified” (Lowe, 2008, p. 98), he assumes that one’s 
mental states are a kind of unity, an I, or a self, as he puts it. 
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There is no reason to set out from the idea of all mental 
states as subject to one irreducible bearer of them all. Cer-
tainly a person needs her brain in order to have mental states, 
but contrary to what Lowe defends it does not seem that the 
relation between brain a ivity and mental states9 can be un-
derstood as the relation of all of one’s mental states and the 
brain. It seems that the a ivity of certain neuronal networks 
can be related to certain mental states. 
One piece of evidence for this relation is that if the brain 
is lesioned and a certain network of neurons is damaged this 
usually results in a loss of cognitive capacities and states, such 
as language comprehension, perception, attention, memories, 
planning complex a ions, etc. (Gazzaniga, 2009). It is even 
the case that a person may recuperate from some of these 
losses, thanks to the human brain’s plasticity, if the relevant 
neurons reorganize their connections and a ivity in an ap-
propriate way (Gazzaniga, 2009; Lüdemann-Podubecká and 
Nowak, 2016). 
It is open to the monist, therefore, to claim that Lowe 
has not shown that there is a set or substance that might be 
all of one’s mental states. The monist may even think that the 
burden of the proof is on Lowe, since he is the one defending 
the existence of an extra substance. It is easy enough to accept 
the existence of bodies, but there is no reason why one should 
accept the existence of all of one’s mental states, conceived as 
ontologically different substance and born by the self. 
I have presented an analysis of Lowe’s argument for 
dualism. His version of substance dualism grounds his con-
ception of agents, which in turn is relevant for his volitionist 
account of human a ions. I have argued that Lowe implicitly 
presupposes his dualist conception of agents; therefore it fails 
to provide support for his view of dualism and for his concep-
tion of agents. Given that according to his theory the agent’s 
will depends on the psychological substance, this is also an is-
sue for Lowe’s account of a ions.
Brain replacement 
and neuroscience
In this section I will briefly discuss an illustration of the 
independence that Lowe proposes one’s mental states have 
from the brain. The argument is that the scenario present-
ed by Lowe, which draws on his conception of an agent as 
a psychological substance distinct from her body, does not 
conform to what neuroscience has been able to clarify about 
brain a ivities and their relation to mental states, e ecial-
ly brain plasticity. Lowe’s view on the agent’s relation to her 
brain is at the centre of this discussion.
It is clear that brain a ivity is crucial for mental states. 
Neurons connect to each other like a network, and when 
these networks are damaged, depending on the amount of 
damage, this affects the person’s cognitions, and even person-
ality. Lowe, however, does not believe that there is a strong 
connection between a person, as he conceives of persons, and 
her brain:
Anyway, quite apart from anything else, it 
seems clear that, even granted that I need 
a brain in order to be able to think, I don’t 
need to have the particular brain that I have. 
I find nothing inconceivable in the thought 
that I might wake up one morning to be told 
(truly) that, overnight, I had undergone an 
operation in which my old organic brain was 
somehow replaced by a new inorganic one 
(Lowe, 2008, p. 21).
On Lowe’s view, a person is a different substance from 
her body, as we saw above. So the person does not need the 
 ecific brain she has in order to think the thoughts she 
thinks; another brain would be sufficient for thinking. This is 
an odd claim. One evidence of its questionability is the brain’s 
plasticity.10 The brain changes throughout a human being’s 
life, because genetics, experience, stimulation, and learning 
contribute to the development of the connections between 
neurons that are associated with the representation of mem-
ories, abilities, and even with personality traits (Freund et al., 
2013; Maguire et al., 2000).
There is evidence that each person’s brain is different 
because of all the cited factors, and perhaps other factors as 
well (Miller, 2012). In fact, these factors have been associated 
with the development of individuality, and they are taken to 
account for differences in individuals’ behaviour and person-
ality (Freund et al., 2013). By this I do not mean to claim that 
the brain is the cause of mental states or properties; I am only 
claiming that there is evidence that they are related. Contrary 
to what Lowe seems to believe, each brain is relevant to each 
person’s behaviour and psychological properties. If this is the 
case, it is highly unlikely that a person’s brain could be ex-
changed for another without any noticeable difference to her. 
The person does not seem to be something different from her 
body in the way that Lowe believes she is. 
Even if one accepts a sci-fi scenario in which an inor-
ganic brain could be produced, in order to replace one’s brain 
it would have to somehow (however its engineering allows) 
represent what the brain a ivity in the original organic brain 
represents. It must be noted that the relevant brain a ivity is 
compatible with the  ecific connections in the individual’s 
9 I will not take a stand on what the relation between mental states and brain activity might be. I shall remain neutral on this issue and 
accept only that there is significant evidence that mental states are correlated to somewhat specific brain activities. By this I do not mean 
to say that a certain neuronal network is the bearer of a mental state, and therefore that these are necessarily identical. 
10 Plasticity is the brain’s capacity to change its structure due to development, new experiences, and environmental demands (Baars and 
Gage, 2010, p. 82). 
Issues for Lowe’s Dualist View on Agents
Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(3): 340-345, sep/dec 2016 345
neuronal network, which is  ecific to her; therefore, these 
 ecificities would have to be reproduced in the inorganic 
brain if the replacement aims at avoiding any noticeable dif-
ference. This is enough to show that there are very particular 
a ects of each brain that are relevant to the person, and for 
each person it is not enough to have just any brain in order to 
think the thoughts one thinks.
Conclusion
I have argued that the conception of the agent as a psy-
chological substance, as well as the concern with a  ecific 
conception of free will motivate and support Lowe’s volitionist 
theory of a ion. However, his argument for his dualist view of 
the agent does not withstand scrutiny, and I claim that this has 
serious consequences for his theory. If the proposed dualism is 
rejected, Lowe’s theory lacks its ground support. 
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